

Foreign Policy under NDA's Second Term

Mohammed Viquaruddin

Associate Professor, School of Liberal Arts,
Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University, Aurangabad, Maharashtra, India
E-Mail: v4politics@gmail.com

Abstract - India always had a liberal approach to other parts of world; independent India pursued a diplomatic strategy based on Non-Alignment. India achieves rapid economic growth and promote economic reform; second, to conduct its diplomatic practices as a leading Asian power and even a global power but rather than as a regional South Asian country. This manuscript tries to cover some discussion on policies now prevailing under NDA-II. The right of center Bharatiya Janata Party government took decisive and bold measures to promote the shift of India's foreign policy. A comparative purpose whether foreign policies are forwarding in continuation to previous governments or framing extrovert which may result to some healthy forerunning features as far as nation is concern. Reading observance issues become an obvious method for research along some necessary text available in form of books on current events happens. This NDA government focuses on the two decade old policy viz ASEAN solidarity, Neighbour wooing, Practical with East. Firm of Security Council membership, SAARC, Middle East were cover through fast track diplomacy. As a part of South Asia, India still has to devote most of its diplomatic and security resources in managing the traditional and nontraditional threats arising from within the region.

Keywords: Greater Good, Post-Nehruvian Era, India's Diplomacy, Asia Pacific Strategy, NDA Government, Mitigating Nationalism, Acting East. Raising Ambition, Fast Track Diplomacy

I. INTRODUCTION

It's a part and parcel of country men to figure out the role of their existence in a spread human civilization. Some other major discussion may shift attention on the scenario of a nation as what world called it a great India. It's notified that the existence of a land on geo-political spectrum is plural before the world. India always had an open arm (liberal) approach towards other parts of world geography. An approach based on social contract theory which naturally developing simultaneously on other parts of the world) with obvious performance of sovereignty. A put forth John Rawls theory that greater good shared by geographical world under an umbrella called foreign policy of each nation.

Over a long period after its independence India pursued a diplomatic strategy based on Non-Alignment. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in his latest book World Order that Jawaharlal Nehru the first Prime Minister of India vowed that the country would become a global power navigating a right course between the U.S. and Soviet camps. However he did not end up his efforts with making

India a neutral state but relied on India's gradually established military power and underdeveloped social economy to co launch the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) with likeminded countries. India was neither willing to be involved in Europe's division and thus offend the Soviet Union, which was only hundreds of miles away nor willing to step into the Middle East conflicts. In addition, India also declined to comment on the acts that North Korea and North Vietnam had done to their Southern counterparts respectively. Indian leaders refused to isolate themselves from what they had confirmed as the ongoing trend of the developing world. They were also reluctant to take the risk of Soviet Union's hostility.¹ with the end of the Cold War and globalization, pragmatism and economic development have increasingly become the guiding principles for India's foreign policy. To deepen the economic reform and break down the constraints on its economic and social development, India has to tilt to and accommodate itself to Western developed countries to some extent and consider and tackle global and regional affairs in a more pragmatic way. India's strategic thought features both continuity and changes.

Thoughts such as the great power mentality, independence, Indo centrism of the Nehruvian era, and pragmatism as well as the strength based policy of the post-Nehruvian era still occupy a dominant position in India's diplomacy, "In the domain of the foreign policy the decade of the 1990s, however saw a sea-change in India's foreign policy"². Its diplomatic strategies in this period have featured two objectives: first, to develop close relations with those countries that can help India achieve rapid economic growth and promote economic reform; second, to conduct its diplomatic practices as a leading Asian power and even a global power but rather than as a regional South Asian country. The right of center Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government took decisive and bold measures to promote the shift of India's foreign policy. The principles prioritizing national prestige and interests of the country were embodied in its diplomatic decision making process. The basic perceptions and framework of India's future foreign policy were thus established. The Congress Party government which took office in 2004 and the BJP government resuming power in 2014 have basically continued the foreign policy of the previous governments and made greater efforts in major-power diplomacy India announced its Look east Policy of 1991 with a view to seeks greater engagement to East Asian countries.

“The Association with Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organization that has emerged as a key component of global governance”³. In order to address the economic content of the look east policy a continuous dialogue is maintained with ASEAN. India’s trade with these countries was US\$ 76.5 billion during the year 2014-15 and US\$ 26.7 billion during 2015 mid of 2016.⁴ Backing India’s Look East policy former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged the country to go further. She said that the United States encourages India not just to Look East but to engage and act East and that India’s leadership in South and Central Asia is critically important.⁵ Indian new Prime Minister Narendra Modi officially adopted this proposal after taking office. Acting East has thus become the orientation of India’s new Asia Pacific strategy. In this context India and Japan reached important agreement in such aspects as security strategy, maritime cooperation, economic relations, trade and investment at the beginning of 2014. India’s Going East and Japan’s Going South have become increasingly complementary on the strategic level and reinforced each other showing strong signs of containment against China. Through economic and trade connectivity, soft power aid and economic and technological cooperation, India has increased its input and expanded its influence in Myanmar. India is also building a strategic partnership with Vietnam and for the first time openly admitted offering assistance to modernize Vietnam’s armed forces and strengthen the country’s maritime power, while involving itself in the exploration and production of oil and gas resources in the disputed area in South China Sea launched by Vietnam.

A formal start of tenure from May 2014 as head of government diplomacy of inviting eight foreign leaders of neighbouring countries to attend his inauguration commence the frame work of diplomacy. A part of international priorities embarked upon state visits to Indian immediate neighbourhoods and crucial Indian Ocean island countries, important Asia-Pacific powers viz: China, Japan, Australia and eventually approach towards Western Europe. In relation to the heading of track three diplomacy showed diplomacy Heads of states meet hi tea, discuss issues and release joint statements, official discussions within political and military leaders focusing on agreements, treaties, cease-fires, peace talks etc. There is an emergence of term track 1.5 to denote a situation in which official and non-official actors work together to resolve conflicts. Another tracked diplomacy occurred within citizens of each nation that almost have some criteria apart from the national ethos of each that everybody had towards their motherland. People to people diplomacy undertaken by individuals and private groups. Common man diplomacy normally focused on the grassroots level, this type of diplomacy often involves organizing meetings and conferences, generating media exposure, and political and legal advocacy for marginalized people and communities.

This NDA government focuses on the two decade old policy formulated during Narshimha Rao regime were

overwhelmed for strategic partnership and security cooperation with ASEAN nations (in particular with Japan and Vietnam). Attempting expectations and s shift in the world view from predecessor Prime Minister. In front of the world India were like a middle power so as to “special category of states that lack the system shaping capabilities of the great powers but whose size, resources and role, nonetheless, precludes them from being ignored by the great powers. The middle powers score fairly high in the major indices of hard and soft power to have a generalised influence of the international system and in the regional affairs in particular”⁶

II. P5 NATIONS

Economic and military capabilities are important to ensure efficient candidates for the permanent membership category on the basis of the functional principle of representation. The power of different states keeps changing and continues to do so. The powers that constituted P-5 in United Nations Security Council have experienced considerable reduction in their power. At the same time the world has seen the emergence of many militaries and economically powerful states. Some of the states like India, Japan and Germany have out weighted some particular members of the permanent membership category of the United Nations Security Council in respect to the some of the power-indicators though there are a lot of arguments whether they will be able to translate these powers to play major power role.⁷ Soon after the new Government took over the office, important world leaders expressed their willingness to work with Modi Government to strengthen their relations with India as it provides them a big market. All 5 permanent member states of United Nations Security Council sent their envoy with to India within the first 100 days from inauguration which is significant given India's long standing bid to get a permanent membership of UNSC.

To take the early movers advantage China was first to send its envoy to India after present government came into power, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi and held bilateral talks in with his counterpart. In other reactions, China indicated a willingness to reach a final settlement of the contested border disputes.^{8,9} Russian Deputy Chairman Dmitry Rogozin visited India in June 2014 to reach out the new government. Where the two sides discussed the cooperation in joint defence production which is one of governments top agenda. Later Modi met President Vladimir Putin in July 2014 on the sidelines of 6th BRICS summit in Brazil.¹⁰

French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius made an official visit to India from 29 June to 2 July and held high level talks with both External Affairs Minister and Prime Minister. Strategic and defence cooperation was top on his agenda and he expressed hope of speedy completion of Dassault Rafale Jet deal as part of the much delayed Indian Medium Multi-Role Combat Air Craft (MMRCA) project under the new government.¹¹ British Foreign Secretary

William Hague visited India on July 2014. During his meeting with Modi he lobbied hard again for Euro Fighter Typhoon as a last minute alternative to Dassault Rafale.¹²

Prior to his India trip U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry emphasized the importance of US-India in twenty first centuries and interestingly he borrowed *Sabka saath, Sabka vikaas* a Hindi slogan from Modi's campaign meaning simply, inclusive growth and said America shared this goal and willing to work in full cooperation with the new government to realize it. He arrived in New Delhi in August and held bilateral talks with his Indian counterpart to make the groundwork ready for Modi's upcoming USA visit and also bid a strong lobby to gain support from India for sanctions on Russia amidst the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Swaraj said in regard to the appeal: "There is no change in our policy. We think that foreign policy is in continuity. Foreign policy does not change to the change in the government."¹³ A flash point part of this government that its policy towards other nation or diplomacy with their five point goals:

A. Neighbourhood First: Improving Connectivity, Mitigating Nationalism

Priority to integrated neighbourhood or Neighbourhood First can derive within four things. The first are New Delhi's willingness to give political and diplomatic priority to its immediate neighbours and the Indian Ocean island states. The second is to provide neighbours with support, as needed, in the form of resources, equipment, and training. The third, and perhaps the most important, is greater connectivity and integration, so as to improve the free flow of goods, people, energy, capital, and information. The fourth is to promote a model of India-led regionalism with which its neighbours are comfortable.

The newfound diplomatic priority to the region is evident in Modi's visits to all of India's neighbours barring The Maldives as well as regular leadership meetings in India and on the sidelines of multilateral summits. India has also become more forthcoming in providing support and in capacity building, whether concluding its biggest ever defence sale to Mauritius, or in providing humanitarian assistance to Nepal or Sri Lanka. With Bangladesh, the completion of the Land Boundary Agreement, improvements in energy connectivity, and steps taken towards accessing the port of Chittagong has all been crucial developments that help to set a positive tone of a region long defined by cross-border suspicion and animosity. India's focus on connectivity is also gradually extending outward, whether to Chabahar in Iran or Kaladan in Myanmar. Although India will continue investing in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an institutional vehicle, it has also expressed a willingness to develop issue-specific groupings that are not held hostage to consensus: a SAARC minus X approach. Two examples of this are the Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal (BBIN) grouping meant to advance motor vehicle movement, water power management, and inter-grid

connectivity and the common SAARC Satellite, which India has decided to proceed with Pakistan's objections.

These concerted efforts have so far had mixed results. Bangladesh and Bhutan have clearly been positive stories for India. Ties with Sri Lanka have proved a mixed bag and disposing to better relations of India. The Maldives has proved more difficult. Although several defence agreements were concluded. The obvious regional outlier has been Nepal, which has been the most vexing foreign policy problem facing the Indian government over the past year. Despite considerable Indian assistance in the aftermath of last year's devastating earthquake that reportedly included over 1,700 tons of relief material and medical assistance to thousands Nepal's constitutional crisis severely set back relations.

The crisis was not of India's making it was primarily the product of differences between Nepal's hill elites and the Madhesis but New Delhi was confronted with a tough choice. Either it could have welcomed a flawed Nepal constitution, knowing that months perhaps years of Madhesi agitation would follow, risking escalation that could have damaged Indian interests. Or it had to take some form into action to urge Kathmandu to revisit the more contentious aspects of the constitution, risking the immense goodwill that it had built up over the previous year. After Indian diplomatic entreaties were dismissed, it opted for the latter. New Delhi was guilty of responding late to fast-moving developments, and despite successfully pressuring Kathmandu to amend some aspects of the contentious constitution, it has not been able to overcome continuing mistrust or resolve the remaining constitutional differences.

B. Bridging Diplomacy and Development

A second major objective of India's foreign relations has been to leverage international partnerships to advance India's domestic development. This includes improving technological access, sourcing capital, adopting best practices, gaining market access, and securing natural resources. In these respects, a truly accurate assessment will only be possible in the years to come, given the lag time of initial agreements and results. That being said, some of the short-term indicators show promising signs. Greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI) has already seen a jump with India surpassing China although how much of that can be attributed to diplomatic efforts is uncertain. Some new international collaborative efforts, such as Japan's ridiculously low-cost loan for a high-speed rail line, have immense potential and, like high-profile Indian metro and airport projects in the recent past, might be replicable. The recently amended tax treaty with Mauritius is but one example of how diplomacy can be used to benefit both investors and the government, and potentially increase India's tax base. The extension of lines of credit to Africa and Iran promises to increase business opportunities for Indian firms. And securing buy in from major Silicon

Valley corporations in increasing Internet accesses in India marks another effort at advancing national development.

In this respect, however, the greatest challenge will be in tying international agreements to domestic agents of change, whether specific ministries, the private sector, or local actors. Securing international agreements are hard enough; using that to spur developments at home is an altogether more challenging proposition. Such complications are most obviously manifested in trade policy, which has more immediate implications for domestic constituencies, and in defence where the government is struggling to balance the desire for defence indigenization, commercial viability and an under-performing public sector led defence industrial complex. The overall trajectory for India's development is certainly positive and the diplomatic momentum has clearly increased. But India still has a mountain to climb to fully harness external inputs to advance economically, socially, and technologically. This will be a decade's long project.

C. Acting East as China Rises

Replacing two decades of India's Look East policy of Act East the purpose was to show greater intent in realising what had long been an aspiration for India: to become an integral part of Asia. The greater urgency implicit in the shift in terminology is largely an outgrowth of Indian concerns regarding China's rise and the upsetting of Asia's delicate balance of power. In addition to the development of military and dual use Chinese infrastructure in India's neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean, India's concerns are three folds: the risk of Chinese assertiveness on the disputed border the possibility of Chinese primacy of the Indo-Pacific region and an uneven economic playing field.

D. Pakistan: Engagement and Isolation

Pakistan's relative importance of India has waned significantly over the past two years. The development of nuclear weapons by both countries has ensured an uneasy peace, while Pakistan despite Indian entreaties has refused to open up economically. Terrorism by entities based on Pakistan, and supported by the country's military and intelligence agencies, continues to be directed at India, although certain measures have helped reduced the number of infiltrations and severity of attacks. Nonetheless, Pakistan remains a political hot button issue and India-Pakistan relations still dominate media coverage and political discourse.

E. India as a Leading Power: Raising Ambitions

In her recent visit to Hanoi, Vietnam Sushma Swaraj has stressed on the need for an Act East Policy¹⁴ that she said should replace India's over two decade-old Look East Policy emphasizing a more proactive role as India in this region.^{15,16,17} India is rising in a world system that has been largely favourable to its rise, but one that India was not

involved in creating. The present international environment represents a rare opportunity for India, which it must use to position itself in a leading role, rather than just a balancing force, globally. India is not yet fully in position to lead, or set the rules of the international order, but it is taking steps to seek full membership of the most important global governance platforms. India is already a member of the G20, the East Asia Summit, and the BRICS coalition, a testament to its status as a large country with a fast-growing economy. New Delhi also naturally aspires to permanent membership in the UN Security Council. It has also been actively lobbying for full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. These efforts could bear fruit as early as 2016, although there has been opposition to China. All the while, India has been trying to bolster its leadership credentials, whether through international relief efforts in Yemen and Libya, reminders of its history of UN peacekeeping, or the public reclamation of its contributions to the World Wars. The successful outcome of the COP21 climate summit in Paris and India's constructive role has also gone some way of shedding its reputation as a multilateral naysayer and obstructionist. India has only just recently embarked upon institution building of its own. The International Solar Alliance represents one such effort, as do the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and BBIN.

E. Fast Track Diplomacy

On completion of the first 100 days of Modi government the External Affairs Ministry published a booklet called Fast Track Diplomacy show-casing the achievement made in the foreign policy arena. In her first media interaction the minister Sushma Swaraj said the catchphrase for her tenure was fast-track diplomacy and said it had three faces proactive, strong and sensitive.¹⁹ Since taking office the External Affairs Minister held round table meeting with all Indian heads of missions to the SAARC region, ASEAN region and Middle East separately as a follow up measure to carry forward the leads gained by high profile visits and exchanges.

III. FINDINGS

Basically foreign policy of any nation is a very subject to deal with many scholars and experts had done great job and their working process is under progress. To capacitate the core factors among the policies are related to some finding on domestic as well as the external/foreign policy. Forces Threatening Internal/External Security: Our source capability, responsive capabilities, answering ability, whether be strengthen become healthy and expansion. Intentions of other policy actors whether they are short term & long term support base capabilities, financial support & sustainability of their ideology. Eye on those forces that didn't realise as threat but they could create disturbances in long span of period. Technological capabilities, financial capability, international support, international muscle,

international bases, collaborative linkages, than who become strong & creating differences in front of country. To extend and expansion in forces & police can create sense of visibility & response of states. But the real capability to fight terror, extremism, to fight deceptive forces, technological invasions couldn't solve up to the satisfaction. National Will: To create national will here is a need of creation of political will & to create a strong political will need of national consensus on national security. What is threat and how dangerous are they & what measures to eradicate the threats. Integrate National Strategy technical capacity to build. Strategy without tactics is only a noise before the defeat, just as tactics without strategy is a shortest way to suicide in a defeated platform. Strength of strategic and technical capabilities is necessary. Knowledge Governance. India needs to grow trade strategy. Viz: All industrial (Big-Small-Home-Cottage-Village industries etc.) units with an obvious climatic observance. Propagation of rich Indian tourism vast level and highly professional way. Number of Chinese tourist was increased from India it may their strategy, we can increase rest of the world tourist with our policies. Which can help improve foreign exchange along with major trade policy initiatives? A legitimized methodological process was present according to Indian per view it should be initiated or framed in well verse.

IV. CONCLUSION

This is an attempt to chalk out the forefronts of its particular play before the world. Foreign Policy of any nation may witness different according to the leadership. It over-shine whenever the legacy of any particular nation were go through the practical implementation. Experts on International Studies should take up the role of promoting the development of Sino-Indian relations of balanced to objectivity in favour of own nation. As a part of South Asia, India still has to devote most of its diplomatic and security resources in managing the traditional and nontraditional threats arising from within the region. India has augmented its hard power resources to make proper its world diplomatic presence with its GDP growth per annum and enhanced its soft power with a vibrant multicultural

democracy, civilization and contribution to the philosophical and scientific body of knowledge.

REFERENCES

- [1] Kissinger Henry, "*India's Role in the World Order*", Penguin Books Ltd, 2014.
- [2] C. Raja Mohan, "*Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*", Penguin Books, New Delhi, pp. 260-63", 2003.
- [3] Helen E. S. Nesadurai, Helmut K. Anheier and Mark Juergensmeyer, "Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Encyclopedia of Global Studies", SAGE Publications, Inc. Thousand Oaks, p. 2, 2012.
- [4] Trade with ASEAN, New Media Wing, India 2017, A Reference Annual, Publication Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MoI&B), Govt of India, pp. 161, 2017.
- [5] Look East and act East, too: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to India, The Economic Times, July 20, 2011. (http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-07-20/news/29794815_1_state-hillary-clinton-india-asia-pacificregion)
- [6] Varun Sahni, "From Security in Asia to Asian Security", *International Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2004.
- [7] M.K. Mishra, "India's Permanent Membership of the U.N. Security Council: Changing Power Realities and Notions of Security", *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. LXVII, No. 2, Apr-June, 2006, p. 343.
- [8] Krishna Uppuluri, "Narendra Modi's Swearing in Offers a New Lease of Life to SAARC", *Daily News and Analysis*, 25 May 2014. Retrieved 15 June 2014.
- [9] PM Swearing-in: US Media Praises Modi for Inviting all SAARC leaders. Firstpost. 27 May 2014. Retrieved 5 August 2014.
- [10] Official Visit of Foreign Minister of French Republic to India (June 29 – July 2, 2014). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
- [11] Visit of Foreign Secretary of United Kingdom to India (July 7-8, 2014). Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
- [12] Russia Sanctions: India Defiant, Finland Nervous. defenseneews.com. 30 July 2014. Retrieved 5 August 2014.
- [13] Sushma Swaraj tells Indian envoys to Act East and not just Look East. *The Economic Times*. 26 August 2014.
- [14] Modi govt to give greater push to India's Look East Policy, says Sushma Swaraj. *Firstpost*. 24-August-2014. Retrieved 10-Sept-2014.
- [15] Sushma Swaraj tells Indian envoys to Act East and not just Look East. *The Economic Times*. 26 August 2014.
- [16] Modi Unveils India's 'Act East Policy' to ASEAN in Myanmar". *The Diplomat*. 17 November 2014. Retrieved 24 November 2014.
- [17] 'Look East' has become 'Act East Policy': PM Narendra Modi at ASEAN". *The Indian Express*. 12 November 2014. Retrieved 24 November 2014.
- [18] PM Modi's 100 days: Sushma Swaraj talks tough on Pakistan, China and US. *The Economic Times*. 2014-09-09. Retrieved 2014-09-10.